by Roderick Ramage, BSc(Econ), solicitor, www.law-office.co.uk

first published (by distribution to professional contacts) on 1 January 2001

revised on 6 January 2008 and 16 August 2015

 


DISCLAIMER

This article is not advice to any person and may not be taken as a definitive statement of the law in general or in any particular case. The author does not accept any responsibility for anything that any person does or does not do as a result of reading it.


 

This note is a basic introduction to the main pensions issues in corporate finance transactions and is written principally from the buyer’s perspective.  It is not a full statement of the law or advice and is not applicable to any particular circumstances, but is intended to be an indication of issues likely to be encountered.

(update 16/08/15)  Minor revisions, but not a complete re-write, to reflect the main pension law changed to date.

 

contents

para

page

1

nature of transaction

2

2

existing pension arrangements

2

(a)

seller’s pension arrangements

3

(b)

buyer’s pension arrangements

4

3

likely outcomes post-completion

4

(a)

buyer’s options vis a vis the seller’s scheme

4

(b)

buyer’s options vis a vis its own scheme

5

(c)

seller’s own scheme

6

4

timetable

6

5

information, warranties

6

6

documentation

7

7

parties

8

(a)

introduction

8

(b)

employees and members

8

(c)

members’ future service options

8

(d)

members’ past service options

9

(e)

impact on employment contracts

9

8

interim period

10

9

transfer value

11

10

deficits

13

(a)

target company’s own scheme

13

(b)

scheme in which the target company participates

13

(c)

reporting to TPR

13

(d)

moral hazard risks and clearances

13

11

automatic enrolment

14

 

1         nature of transaction

        The purchase of a business can be either of shares or assets, which have different pension consequences from each other.  A third possibility, contracting-out from government, local government and similar bodies has another set of pension consequences.

(a)     Share purchases.  If shares are purchased the buyer acquires the target company lock, stock and barrel and everything that goes with it, all the company's assets, liabilities and employees including its pension scheme.

(b)     Assets purchase.  If the transaction is an assets purchase, the buyer acquires only those assets which it agrees and often takes no liabilities.  Under Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 1981 (TUPE), the employees in the business will pass automatically to the buyer on the terms of their existing contracts, but TUPE expressly excludes rights under occupational pension schemes (OPSs) to benefits on old age and invalidity and for dependants.  Other pension scheme rights may pass under TUPE (usually rare in private sector schemes):  see my website article about the Beckman and South Bank cases.  The lack of rights for members of occupational pension schemes whose employment transferred under TUPE remained wholly unsatisfactory until 6 April 2005, when ss257 and 258 of the Pension Act 2004 altered the effect of TUPE and improved their position to an extent:  see my website article.  In practice better rights may sometimes be given voluntarily to avoid the HR problems, which could result when rights given by the new employer in accordance with TUPE are materially inferior to those in the transferor’s pension scheme.

(c)      Contracting-out.  These transactions are usually a form of TUPE transfer but outsourcing contracts from government etc bodies may be subject to policy principles for fair employment which require transferring employees to be given pension rights equivalent to those in their former employment.  Some schemes, eg the Local Government Pension Scheme, have been altered to permit contractors, to whom employees have been transferred under TUPE, to participate in them as an alternative to establishing a new matching scheme to enable transferring employees to enjoy the same pension benefits as previously.  The fair employment policies were formerly to be found in ODPM Circular 03/2003, but the current (October 2013) guidance note “Fair Deal for Staff Pensions” is now available at the link below: see my website article.  From 1 October 2007, a direction under the Local Government Act 2003, s101gives statutory force to what was previously only guidance.

www.gov/government/publications/fair-deal-guidance (but cannot be accessed except by eg a Google search for “Fair deal for staff pensions 2013”)

         

2         existing pension arrangements

        Before any decision can be made about pension arrangements in the transaction and its documentation, the buyer should ascertain what arrangements the seller has and decide what its own pensions policy is going to be after completion.

(a)     The seller’s pension arrangements are likely to include the following:

(i)       no pensions;

(ii)     personal pension plans (including grouped personal pension plans - GPPPs), under which the employer's only involvement will be an employment contract obligation to pay specified contributions and (almost invariably) a payroll deduction service for the members’ contributions;

(iii)    stakeholder pensions, which from an employment and TUPE perspective can be treated as personal pension plans, although capable of being established as occupational pension schemes;

(iv)    life assurance only schemes, which often exists alongside a GPPP or stakeholder scheme, to provided death in service benefits;

(v)     (in a share sale) an OPS exclusively for the target’s employees, in which case the scheme will normally be acquired automatically along with the target company with no need for any apportionment between employees who come over and employees who remain with the seller;

(vi)    (in an assets purchase) an exclusive OPS for the TUPE employees, in which the case the scheme does not automatically come over but it may be sensible and practicable for the buyer to acquire the scheme by being appointed as principal employer and appointing its own trustees in place of the seller and its trustees;

(vii)  (in a share sale) the target company participates in the seller's OPS for the benefit of its employees, which is the common situation in which the buyer may wish to continue to participate in the scheme for a limited period and then (if relevant) negotiate transfer amounts for the employees who join the buyer's scheme, but which may result in triggering a debt on the employer (see para 10(b) below);

(viii)  (in a share sale) an OPS with other employers participating in it, in which case the scheme comes over automatically but the members of it who are not employed by the target company will usually (but since A-Day are not required to) come out of the scheme and any of the target's former associated companies which participate in the scheme must cease to participate (NB this is unusual, because normally it is the parent company of a group which is the principal employer not one of the subsidiaries and generally the target would be a subsidiary);

(ix)    (in an assets purchase) an OPS in which the TUPE employees and others participate, which is very similar to the share sale example in (vii) above, in which completion may be followed by an interim period of participation by the buyer and (if relevant) the payment of a transfer amount;

(x)     (applicable to both share and asset sales) the target company or the seller participates in a third party's OPS (eg an industry wide scheme), in which various possibilities are open, but the seller's involvement may be no more than providing whatever co-operation the buyer requires if the buyer wishes to continue to participate in it; or

(xi)    on an outsourcing contract from a government etc body, there may be a TUPE transfer of employees, but the transferor’s scheme is likely to be a final salary scheme in the transferee will be required to participate or which it will be required to replicate.

(b)     The buyer’s pension arrangements before completion are likely to be or include the following:

(i)       no pensions;

(ii)     stakeholder pensions;

(iii)    GPPP or other personal pension plans;

(iv)    an OPS for its own employees and perhaps employees in subsidiary or associated companies;

(v)     participation in its parent company's OPS; or

(vi)    participation in a third party's OPS.

 

3         likely outcomes post-completion

(a)     The buyer's long term options vis a vis the seller's OPS usually include the following:

(i)       take the seller’s pension scheme;

(ii)     leave the seller’s pension scheme behind without any transfer value;

(iii)    participate in the seller’s pension scheme for a limited period, whether or not there is provision to take a transfer value;

(iv)    participate in the seller’s pension scheme for an indefinite period.

Option (i) will apply only where there is an exclusive scheme under 2(a) (v) or (vi) above.  In a share sale the target is likely to be the principal employer already, but in an assets sale the buyer would become the principal employer.  This can also be applicable if the target company’s or the TUPE employees are the majority of the membership and only a relatively small number of other employees are to come out of the scheme after completion.

Option (ii) is likely to be relevant if: either there is a deficit in the scheme, with which the buyer does not wish to be associated and risk possible liability; or if what the buyer wishes to do for future pension provision is so different from the seller's arrangements that participation would be inappropriate.  Here the buyer will need to be in a position to commence its new arrangements on completion.  It is particularity important to ensure that life assurance cover for death in service benefits is available immediately on completion; for otherwise an employee will die on the day of completion, and the new owner will arrival at work on the next morning to be met by the grieving widow (with a babe in arms) asking to know how much she will get and when.

The position in option (iii) was once popular.  Not only did it offer a period of temporary participation in the seller’s scheme until the buyer’s arrangements are made, but it gave time for the buyer and seller to agree a transfer value to be paid from the seller's scheme to the buyer's scheme for those members who wish to take advantage of it.  Now that final salary scheme are more commonly in deficit than surplus and favourable transfer value are generally not available, buyers are more likely to decide not to particulate in sellers’ scheme to avoid the risk of any liability for its deficit, ie option (ii).

Option (iv) will apply only in the case of outsourcing from a government etc body, and in these cases it may be the only practical alternative available to the transferee.

(b)     the buyer’s options vis a vis its own scheme are:

(i)       to continue seller’s scheme as its own;

(ii)     to admit “transferred” employees to buyer’s existing occupational scheme or establish a new one;

(iii)    to establish a GPPP or other personal pension plans or make a stakeholder pension available for the transferred employees; or

(iv)    to do nothing.

The first option is applicable only if the buyer takes over the seller's scheme

The second is a common arrangement and using an existing scheme or forming a new one depends on the buyer's existing pension arrangements.  In the case of an MBO a new scheme is invariably necessary.

When a small subsidiary is being bought form a large group, the new proprietor may wish to have a GPPP instead of an occupational pension scheme: see my website article about different types of money purchase schemes.  This can be applicable either on leaving the seller's scheme behind on completion or after participating in it for a temporary period.

Doing nothing is applicable only if the seller's scheme is left behind and there is no temporary participation after completion and will not be possible in the case of TUPE transfers and is unlikely to be possible on outsourcing from government etc bodies.  Even if the buyer does nothing it is likely to be obliged to provide a stakeholder pension scheme:  see my website article about stakeholder schemes.

(c)      Where the seller’s own scheme is for his (or her) and no other person’s benefits, usually a small self-administered pension scheme or an executive pension scheme, it is in effect his own savings plan and he will wish to retain control of it and its value; and the buyer will wish to have nothing to do with it and in particular to ensure that he has no financial inability in respect of it.  See my website article about proprietors’ own schemes.

 

4         timetable

(a)     Heads of terms - sets out the main principles including pension terms.  If the target or seller has a final salary pension scheme in deficit, pensions cannot be left until just before midnight on the day of completion.

(b)     Pre-deal 1 – substantially gathering information about the scheme including actuarial valuation and draft pension clauses and schedules.

(c)      Pre-deal 2 – dealing with the Pension Regulator (TPR).  Completion may have to be deferred until clearance is obtained under the moral hazard provisions of the Pensions Act 2004, if either the seller or buyer might be at risk. See para 19(c) and (d) below.

(d)     Completion - so far as concerns pensions, the sale agreement and associated documents include warranties and disclosures, and (if applicable) provide for temporary participation and agree transfer and basis of the transfer value valuation.

(e)     Interim period (if applicable) – participation in the seller’s scheme, contributions to it and setting up a new scheme, ending on the date on which the relevant members may join the buyer’s pension scheme, often called the establishment date.

(f)      Transfer date (if applicable), when target company’s employees or the employees transferring under TUPE cease to be members of the seller’s scheme and possibly also the day on which the transfer amount is paid.

 

5         information, warranties

(a)     What benefits?  Mainly the following, normally just (i) and (ii) but sometimes the others.

(i)       pensions

(ii)     life assurance on death in service

(iii)    disability insurance

(iv)    medical insurance

(b)     Evidence

(i)       deeds

(ii)     booklets

(iii)    announcements

(iv)    membership list

(v)     accounts

(vi)    valuations

(c)      What kind of scheme?

(i)       occupational - money purchase or final (or eg average) salary

(ii)     occupational – life assurance only

(iii)    personal (including GPPP) - money purchase

(iv)    stakeholder (ceased to be compulsory 1 October 2012)

(d)     Also

(i)       whether contracted-out (will cease 6 April 2016)

(ii)     whether registered with HMRC

(iii)    funding levels

(iv)    nature of investments

(v)     investment in the target company

(vi)    insurance (for death in service claims)

(vii)  claims and liabilities

(viii) compliance with law

(ix)    who else participates

(x)     automatic enrolment (see my website article)

 

6         documentation

(a)     The classic procedure dealing with an OPS, especially where there is to be an interim period of participation and a transfer of liabilities and assets, is to have a separate pension schedule in the sale and purchase agreement so that all the pension matters, warranties, interim arrangements etc can be dealt with in one place.  In these cases the only reference to pensions in the body of the agreement will be a clause referring to the pensions schedule.  Sometimes however the pension warranties are placed with the other warranties and only if other pension clauses are necessary will there be a pension schedule.  That is only a matter of layout.  There is an important alternative, which is an ideal solution but rarely done, which is that there is a separate pensions agreement involving the trustees of the pension scheme as well as the seller and buyer.  In the sale agreement there are only two parties, the seller and buyer and perhaps the target company.  In the pension arrangements there are the seller, the buyer, the two sets of trustees (the seller’s scheme and the buyer’s scheme) and the members.  As the transaction involves members’ rights to join a scheme and the transfer of their previous rights from one scheme to another and the release of the previous scheme's trustees, the key players are the pension scheme trustees who are not (at least in law) controlled by the seller or buyer.

(b)     usual clauses

(i)       definitions

(ii)     warranties

(iii)    interim period

(iv)    transfer value

(v)     indemnities (eg for “Beckman” liabilities and scheme deficits)

    If a transfer payment is to be made from a final salary scheme, there are extensive actuarial assumptions to be agreed, which can be in the sale and purchase agreement but more often are set out in a separate letter agreed between the actuaries for the two schemes.

 

7         parties

(a)     Usually the only parties to the sale and purchase agreement are

(i)       the seller, and

(ii)     the buyer,

but the pension scheme also involves

(iii)    the trustees of seller's scheme,

(iv)    the trustees of buyer's scheme, and

(v)     the members,

none of whom are party to the sale agreement, except for the rare cases in which the trustees are party to a separate pension agreement.

(b)     Employees and members

There are four common definitions in the sale and purchase agreement.

(i)       “Employees” - Identifies all the employees who are employed by the target company or who will transfer under TUPE or by agreements.

(ii)     “Eligible Employees” - These are employees who because of length of service, age etc are eligible to join the seller's or target’s pension scheme but would not have done so at completion.

(iii)    “Relevant Members” - This category covers all the employees who are at completion members of the seller's or target’s pension scheme.

(iv)    “Transferring Members” - Not every relevant member will wish to transfer his or her past service rights to the buyer's scheme.  Therefore, usually during the interim period, the relevant employees are given their options and if they choose to transfer their past service rights to the buyer scheme and sign the appropriate forms they will become transferring members and the transfer clauses will refer to them using that definition.

(c)      “Relevant Members” options – future service

If the buyer offers a pension arrangement, the relevant members will have a choice whether or not to join it to provide pension benefits for future service from either completion or, if the buyer participates in the seller’s scheme from the establishment date at the end of the interim period.  By s160 of the Pension Schemes Act 1993 (originally s15 of the Social Security Act 1986), an employer cannot by the terms of employment make it compulsory to join its pension scheme.  One way round this prohibition is join employees automatically in the scheme but give them a right to opt out of it.

(d)     “Relevant Members” options – past service

What members can do with their rights in the seller’s scheme for service up to completion or the establishment date depends whether or not they join the buyer’s scheme for future pension service.  If they join the buyer’s scheme and it makes the option available, they have three options:

(i)       leave their past service rights in the seller’s scheme as deferred members;

(ii)     transfer them to the buyer’s scheme; or

(iii)    transfer them to a personal pension policy or some other buyout arrangement.

All of those arrangements are available to employees who have joined the buyer’s scheme, but they cannot be compelled to do any of them as they have the right to choose.  There are exceptional circumstances in which a bulk transfer can be made, principally on transfers to another scheme of the same employer or when a scheme is being wound up, but they are not applicable in ordinary share and assets sales.  Where the members do not join the buyer’s scheme they still have the choice between leaving their rights for past service in the seller's scheme or transferring them to a buyout arrangement, but will not have the right to transfer to the buyer scheme.

(e)     Impact on employment contracts

Changing employment terms  The normal rule is that any change in fundamental employment terms to which an employee does not agree can result in a breach of contract leading to a constructive dismissal, which is usually unfair, but changes can be enforced with good reasons, consultation etc.  However the rule is different after a TUPE transfer, when, even if the employee consents to it, a change will be invalid and can result in an automatically unfair dismissal, unless the change is for an economic, technical or organisational (ETO) reason.

Pensions as contacts?  Although employers may attempt to avoid contractual pension obligations to their employees, in practice either the “pension promise” is part of the employment contract or a change to it could be a breach of the implied duty of trust and good faith.  Changing pension terms adversely is likely to involve the same risks as changing employment terms.

Changes after share sales  Where adverse changes are made to pension arrangements after a share purchase, the consequences are likely to be the same as for any significant change in employment terms:  it can be done but some work and care are needed to avoid the risk of constructive dismissal claims.

Changes after assets sale  As rights under an OPS – apart from “Beckman” rights - are exempt from TUPE, the provision of an inferior pension scheme by the transferor does not result in adverse legal (as opposed to HR) consequences.  It is likely in many cases that the pension scheme to be provided by the transferee to satisfy TUPE as amended (see para 1(b) above) will be inferior to the transferor’s scheme.  It is different with personal pension plans, which are not exempt form TUPE.  Therefore a transferor’s contractual obligation to contribute to an employee’s personal pension plan or to provide some other form of pension (eg unfunded) is an obligation, which is transferred to the transferee and cannot be changed except for an ETO reason.

 

8         interim period

(a)     This is a temporary arrangement to enable employees to remain in the seller’s pension scheme while the buyer makes new pension arrangements.  In the past, when many pension schemes had (or seemed to have) surpluses, the interim period also gave time for the trustees of both schemes (and their actuaries) to prepare for and make the transfer payment from the seller’s to the buyer’s scheme.  The maximum permitted period is for the remainder of the seller's pension scheme year plus 12 months, so if the renewal date is on 31 December and the completion date is 1 January the buyer could have almost two years participation.

(b)     There are cases, eg when the seller has a generous scheme and the buyer wishes to allow members to have the maximum benefit of it before going into a new arrangement, when the parties might agree a long period.  Otherwise in practice parties tend to work towards a shorter period say six months.  There must be sufficient time for the buyer to set up a new scheme and, if relevant, for the transfer value to be calculated and members’ consents obtained.

(c)      During the interim period all the relevant members remain in the seller's scheme.  There needs to be agreement on terms for eligible employees to join (or not) and about the payment of contributions by the buyer, which usually specify the contribution rate plus insurance premiums for life insurance.  Usually pay rises by the buyer are limited to a specified percentage unless the buyer pays an additional contribution, because pay rises can affect the transfer value and increase the liabilities of the seller’s scheme.

(d)     Also during the interim period the buyer invites relevant members to join the buyer's scheme and obtains the written consent of relevant members to transfer as assets and liabilities from the seller's to the buyer's scheme, and to release the trustees of the seller's scheme.

 

9         transfer value

(a)     Where the whole scheme is taken over the transfer value is irrelevant but valuation and funding warranties will be important.

(b)     If the scheme is a money purchase scheme, then the transfer value is the aggregate of the transferring members' accounts.  Occasionally a money purchase scheme may have an unallocated fund and that will have to be negotiated separately.

(c)      In the typical (but increasingly rare) case of a well funded final salary scheme in which only some members of the whole scheme are transferred into the buyer’s new scheme a transfer value will be calculated to represent the value of their past service.  There are numerous possibilities, of which the following are common.

(i)       The least generous arrangement is that the sellers scheme gives only leaving service benefits.  This is the amount which a member will be entitled to if he or she asked for a cash equivalent to be transferred to a personal pension plan or some other a buyout arrangement and is based on salary at the date of leaving the scheme and length of service at that date.  This is the equivalent of the statutory minimum funding requirement basis of valuation, but may be less is so certified by the actuary because of the scheme’s deficit.  If this is offered there is almost certainly little point in having transfer clauses because there is no benefit to the buyer or its members.

(ii)     A more generous and more common arrangement is to pay a past service reserve.  This is calculated on the basis of service to the date of transfer but with the salary projected to normal retirement date and therefore it does have some allowance for future pay rises and their impact on past service.

(iii)    Another arrangement is share of fund.  This is normally applicable only if there was a substantial surplus which is to be shared.  Typically the actuaries would calculate the value of the liabilities of the transferring employees and the retained employees and apportion assets in the same ratio.  This could also apply where the seller’s scheme is in deficit, if it is part of the transaction that the liability for the deficit is to be shared between the seller and the buyer.

(d)     payment of transfer value

(i)       The parties have an option whether the transfer value is paid in cash or in assets.  If it is paid in cash there are dealing costs which have to be borne by either the seller or the buyer which is one reason why in many cases there is provision for transferring assets instead.  The valuation may be done at any of the completion dates, the date when the buyer establishes a new scheme which members join or the date on which the transfer payment is actually made.  The last is impractical.  An adjustment is usually needed from the date of calculation to the date of transfer which could be either interest at a specified rate or some market adjustment, eg by reference to a specified managed fund.

(ii)     As the trustees are very rarely parties to the pension arrangements, it is not in the seller’s power to ensure that an agreed transfer value is actually paid and the trustees may decide to make transfers on a different basis from that agreed between the parties to the transaction.  Therefore provision is often made for the seller to pay to the buyer any shortfall between the amount paid by the transferring trustees and the agreed amount or for the buyer to pay any excess to the seller.  The latter may be rare, but it is conceivable that a seller might use such a provision as a means of extracting surplus from a pension scheme without the 40% tax charge or complying with the statutory requirements for the payment of funds to an employer.  In both cases there must be provision for the impact of taxation on the receipt or payment of amount to reflect payments made under such clauses as these.

(iii)    The elaborate and expensive process of negotiating terms for the transfer amount and its calculation can be wholly wasted if none or only a small proportion of the members chose to take transfers to the buyer’s scheme instead of leaving their past service rights in the seller’s scheme:  see para 7(d) above.  It should be only in cases where there is a substantial surplus in the seller’s pension scheme that provisions of this kind can be justified.

 

10      deficits

        There was a time when (apparent) surpluses in pension schemes were a motive for predatory acquisitions, but now that deficits in final salary schemes seem to be the norm, the deficits can be a major factor in discouraging acquisitions, affecting the way they are structured and influencing the prices paid for shares and businesses.

        The buyer needs to assess the risk presented by the scheme.  At one extreme a scheme in wind-up or (eg) over which the trustees have power to put it into wind-up is likely to represent a serious financial risk scheme, because of the high cost of the annuities that will have to be bought to complete the winding up.  Towards the other end of the range of risks could be a scheme in deficit (perhaps even serious by current accounting and actuarial standards) but which, because the employer is capable of sustaining it more or less indefinitely and the trustees have no power to precipitate a winding up, present very little “real world” commercial risk.

        The following are a few examples of the impact of pensions.

(a)     Share purchase and deficit in target company’s own scheme (no other participating employers).  This is likely to be largely a matter of assessing the risk and its impact on the price.  The alternative is an assets purchase, leaving the risk with the seller.  In the absence of a wide and specific winding up events in the scheme’s trust deed, either of these sales is likely to cause the scheme to be wound up, but may have other repercussions with TPR:  see (c) or (d) below.

(b)     Share purchase and deficit in seller’s scheme in which the target company participates.  This is likely to have TPR repercussions, is unlikely to trigger a winding up but will trigger a debt on the employer:  see my website article on multi-employer schemes.

(c)      Reporting to TPR.  Specified events must be reported to TPR by the trustees and employer:  see my website article on reporting and whistleblowing.  In the context of corporate finance transactions events (i) and (ii) below will be reportable and the circumstances may require a report of (iii):

(i)       the seller ceasing to carry on business (eg assets sale);

(ii)     controlling company relinquishing control (eg share sale of subsidiary); and

(iii)    a decision resulting in the debt on the employer not being paid in full (eg assets sale after which the seller has no assets for the scheme after discharging secured creditors).

(d)     Moral hazard risks and clearances under the Pensions Act 2004:  see my website article on moral hazards.  Seeking clearance is voluntary, and each of the seller and buyer needs to assess the risks rather than assume automatically that clearance is necessary, weighed against the inevitable delay and the necessary disclosure of sensitive information not just to TPR but also to the scheme’s trustees and the other parties and their financiers.  The seller and buyer have different reasons for seeking clearance.

(i)       The risk to the seller is of a contribution notice.  For instance a scheme might be secure in the target under is pre-sale ownership, but if assets are extracted by a pre-completion  dividend and the target company gives financial assistance to the buyer and enters into debentures and cross-guarantees in favour of the buyer’s financiers, the scheme’s position as an unsecured creditor after completion will be greatly weakened.

(ii)     The risk to the buyer could be no more than of a financial support direction, but in the example in (i) the giving of financial assistance could give rise to a contribution notice.

11      deficits

        The automatic enrolment (AE) requirement applies to employers.  In share purchases buyers are concerned that the target has complied with its obligations under the Pensions Act 2008.  This is of no legal interest to the buyer of assets, because it will it will be obliged to comply with the AE requirement in respect of the employees transferring to it under TUPE, but in practice it might be convenient for it to know the seller’s AE arrangements and perhaps to use the seller’s AE pension scheme provider.

 

 

 

 

other relevant articles on my website – with hyperlinks

referred to in above para

TUPE & Pensions (Beckman)

2(b)

TUPE after the Pensions Act 2004

2(b)

new fair deal

2(c)

2007 direction

2(c)

proprietors’ own schemes

3(c)

automatic enrolment

5(d)(x)

multi-employer pension schemes

13(b)

reporting and whistleblowing under the pensions act 2004

13(c)

Pensions Act 2004 – “moral hazard”

13(d)

 

 

 

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